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Abstract
This paper explores the gain maximization problem of two nations
engaging in non-cooperative bilateral trade. Probabilistic model of an
exchange of commodities under different price systems is considered.
Volume of commodities exchanged determines the demand each nation
has over the counter party’s currency. However, each nation can ma-
nipulate this quantity by imposing a tariff on imported commodities.
As long as the gain from trade is determined by the balance between
imported and exported commodities, such a scenario results in a two
party game where Nash equilibrium tariffs are determined for various
foreign currency demand functions and ultimately, the exchange rate
based on optimal tariffs is obtained.
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1 Introduction
Scientists have studied the trade gain maximization problem from different
perspectives. R. Gibbons [1] considered a game model in which total welfare
of a country consists of an economic surplus enjoyed by consumers, profit
earned by firms within a given country and the tariff revenue collected from
the imports. Maximization of the total welfare from trade leads to optimal
tariff countries involved in trade should impose.
In [2], a closed economy model is considered in which the country con-
sists of a fixed number of households having preferences as a function of
consumption and leisure. Within this model, consumption goods consist of
intermediate goods that can be produced by units of labor. Under the closed
economy model, quantities of each intermediate good and the tariff a given
country imposes on imports are optimized.
Due to different circumstances of production, two nations can produce
similar goods and services at different prices. They can both benefit by
getting involved in international trade to import commodities, which under
their own price system is of relatively low price than domestically produced
commodities, which under the same price system is of relatively high price.
The volume of commodities imported determines one nation’s demand for
another nation’s currency. Balance of demands of two nations for foreign
currency determines an exchange rate. J. T. Schwartz [5] considered a model
of gain maximization where the commodities produced and the prices for
those commodities are static. In addition, gain from trade is determined to
be the difference between the values of imported and exported commodities
measured in national currency. Since importing those commodities which
cost less under the national price system is regarded as a benefit for both
nations, gain from competitive trade for a given nation is considered to be
the difference between the advantage it took over the competitor and the
advantage the competitor took over it, thus the difference between imports
and exports measured at national currency. The Schwartz’s model solves the
tariff optimization problem for two nations which are said to be economically
symmetric, meaning they have equal demands for each other’s currency under
a given exchange rate.
The novelty of the approach examined in this paper is to make the com-
modities and their prices random and solve the gain maximization problem
under Nash’s sense. In addition, non-cooperative bilateral trade model is
generalized for asymmetric case and a more realistic problem where two na-
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tions have different demands for foreign currency is solved.
Greatest mutual benefit is achieved when nations cooperate and pursue
a free trade policy. Here we assume the non-cooperative game, so they de-
termine the optimal tariffs which results in greatest benefit for them under
the Nash’s sense.
2 Equations for Nash-equilibrium tariffs and
exchange rate
Let us assume two nations exchange N different commodities for which the
demand and prices are known. For the domestic and foreign nations, an-
nual demand and corresponding prices measured in national currency are
d1, ..., dN , p1, ..., pN and d
∗
1, ..., d
∗
N , p
∗
1, ..., p
∗
N respectively. If we take x as an
exchange rate of a unit of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency
units, then the domestic and foreign nations’ demand for foreign currency
are given by
D(x) :=
1
CN
N∑
k=1
E¯
(
p∗kdk,
pk
p∗k
> x
)
(1)
and
D∗(x) :=
1
C∗N
N∑
k=1
E¯
(
pkd
∗
k,
pk
p∗k
< x
)
(2)
respectively, where CN =
∑N
k=1 E¯ (p
∗
kdk) , C
∗
N =
∑N
k=1 E¯ (pkd
∗
k) and E¯ is the
mathematical expectation under P¯ on a probability space (Ω¯, F¯ , Ω¯). If we
introduce the extended probability space (Ω, F, P ), where
Ω = Ω¯× {1, ..., N}, P (A, k) = 1
N
P¯ (A), A ∈ F¯
and define random variables p, p∗, d, d∗ by
p(ω, k) = pk(ω), p
∗(ω, k) = p∗k(ω),
d(ω, k) = dk(ω), d
∗(ω, k) = d∗k(ω),
then (1),(2) can be rewritten as probability distribution functions
D(x) = E
(
p∗d,
p
p∗
> x
)
, D∗(x) = E
(
pd∗,
p
p∗
< x
)
. (3)
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which indicate that the domestic nation will import the commodity if p
p∗ > x
and the foreign nation will import if p
p∗ < x. Since x is the value of a unit
of foreign currency in terms of the domestic currency units, increasing the
exchange rate makes foreign commodities more expensive for the domestic
nation and the domestic commodities less expensive for the foreign nation.
Therefore, D is a decreasing function of x and D∗ is an increasing function
of x. These functions have the following properties
D(0) = 1, D(∞) = 0, D∗(0) = 0, D∗(∞) = 1.
Figure 1: D(x) and D∗(x) Figure 2: D(x) and D∗(1/x)
For an exchange rate x, solving the equation
xD(x) = D∗(x) (4)
for x yields the equilibrium rate x = e. This equation determines the equi-
librium exchange rate when both nations practice an unrestricted free trade
policy. Left side of the equation is the foreign currency demand of a domestic
nation and the right side is the foreign currency demand of a foreign nation,
both measured in domestic currency units.
Now suppose the domestic and foreign governments impose the following
tariffs on imported commodities: 1−θ and 1−θ∗. Then the domestic nation
will import the commodity if pθ
p∗ > x, and the foreign nation will import if
p∗θ∗
p
> 1
x
. Taking tariffs into account, the demand functions (3) now become
D(
x
θ
) = E
(
p∗d1{θp>xp∗}
)
, D∗(xθ∗) = E
(
pd∗1{θ∗p∗x>p}
)
.
So the relation (4) is rewritten as
xD(
x
θ
) = D∗(θ∗x), (5)
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from which it is clear that the equilibrium exchange rate x = e now depends
on θ and θ∗. Equation (5) always has the solution e = 0, 1
e
= 0, or θ = θ∗ = 0,
which do not carry any useful economic sense. Such conditions would restrict
the involvement of both nations in trade. To rule out these possibilities, we
claim 1
M
≤ e ≤M , for some large number M and 1
M
≤ θ ≤ 1, 1
M
≤ θ∗ ≤ 1
Since the ultimate goal of both nations is to set the tariffs unilaterally
which will maximize their gain from trade, we have to find the Nash equi-
librium point, the pair (θˆ, θˆ∗). The gain functions of each nation are given
by
G(e, θ, θ∗) = E
(
pd,
p∗
p
<
θ
e
)
− E
(
pd∗,
p∗
p
>
1
eθ∗
)
(6)
= E
(
p
p∗
1( p
p∗>
e
θ
)p
∗d
)
− E
(
pd∗1( p
p∗>
e
θ
)
)
= −
∫ ∞
e/θ
yD′(y)dy −D∗(θ∗e),
and
G∗(e, θ, θ∗) = E(p∗d∗,
p
p∗
< θ∗e)− E(p∗d, p
p∗
>
e
θ
) (7)
=
∫ ∞
1
θ∗e
1
y
D∗′
(
1
y
)
dy −D
(e
θ
)
,
respectively. Since the equilibrium exchange rate is the function of tariffs, we
have e = e(θ, θ∗). Our goal is to find the Nash equilibrium for the nations,
i.e. such pair (θˆ, θˆ∗) that relations
max
θ
G(e(θ, θˆ∗), θ, θˆ∗) = G(e(θˆ, θˆ∗), θˆ, θˆ∗),
max
θ∗
G∗(e(θˆ, θ∗), θ, θˆ∗) = G∗(e(θˆ, θˆ∗), θˆ, θˆ∗)
hold. The Nash pair is found from the system of equations
∂
∂θ
G(e, θ, θ∗) = 0, (8)
∂
∂θ∗
G∗(e, θ, θ∗) = 0 (9)
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Given the currency demand functions D(x) and D∗(x), solution to the
system of equations (8),(9) leads to yet another system of equations (Ap-
pendix A)
D(
e
θ
) = θ∗(1− θ)D∗′(θ∗e), (10)
D(
e
θ
) =
e
θ
(θ∗ − 1)D′(e
θ
) (11)
Remark. According to (5), D( e
θ
) = D
∗(θ∗e)
e
. Then (10) can be rewritten
as
D∗(θ∗e) = eθ∗(1− θ)D∗′(θ∗e) (12)
Denoting e˜ = 1
e
, D˜(x) = D∗( 1
x
), (12) now becomes
D˜(
e˜
θ∗
) =
e˜
θ∗
(θ − 1)D˜′( e˜
θ∗
),
which is similar to (11).
At this point, if the demand functions for foreign currency of each nation
are known, from (10) and (11) the Nash equilibrium pair (θˆ, θˆ∗) can be found.
Ultimately putting these values in (5) and solving for x will result in the
equilibrium triple (eˆ, θˆ, θˆ∗) = (e(θˆ, θˆ∗), θˆ, θˆ∗). Hence the triple satisfy
eˆD(
eˆ
θˆ
) = D∗(θˆ∗eˆ), (13)
D(
eˆ
θˆ
) = θˆ∗(1− θˆ)D∗′(θˆ∗eˆ), (14)
D(
eˆ
θˆ
) =
eˆ
θˆ
(θˆ∗ − 1)D′( eˆ
θˆ
). (15)
Obviously, one should check whether the extremum points given by (10)
and (11) are really maximums. Differentiating the derivatives of the gain
functions once again and checking the signs for the equilibrium points serve
this purpose. So the following inequalities must hold
∂2
∂θ2
G(eˆ, θˆ, θˆ∗) < 0,
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∂2
∂θ∗2
G∗(eˆ, θˆ, θˆ∗) < 0
which means (Appendix A)
θˆ∗2(1− θˆ)eθˆD∗′′(θˆ∗eˆ)− θˆ∗D∗′(θˆ∗eˆ)−
eθˆθˆ − eˆ
θˆ2
D′(
eˆ
θˆ
) < 0, (16)
θˆ(θˆ∗eθˆ∗ + eˆ)D
′(
eˆ
θˆ
)− (1− θˆ∗)eθˆ∗ eˆD′′(
eˆ
θˆ
) > 0. (17)
Hence we can formulate our main result: If pair (θˆ, θˆ∗) ∈ ( 1
M
, 1)2 is a unique
solution of (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), then it is the Nash equilibrium of the
game.
3 Examples of symmetric and asymmetric coun-
tries
Demand functions differ from nation to nation. Specifically, two nations are
said to be economically symmetric if
D(x) = D∗
(
1
x
)
, (18)
which implies that their demand for each other’s currency are equal under any
given exchange rate. Economically, this means that on average they produce
and exchange commodities of equal value. In case of symmetric nations, from
(5) we can simply conclude that e(θ∗, θ) = 1
e(θ,θ∗) . Thus e(θ, θ) = 1, which
makes perfect sense. Since two nations have equal demand for each other’s
currency, neither is able to employ dominant economic power over the counter
party, so the Nash equilibrium will occur at equal tariffs and a unit exchange
rate. More rigorously, since G∗( 1
e(θ,θ∗) , θ
∗, θ) = G(e(θ, θ∗), θ, θ∗), from the
result of Game Theory ([3],p.134) follows that θˆ = θˆ∗ for Nash point (θˆ, θˆ∗).
This fact simplifies the computations above. Specifically, taking θ = θ∗ and
e = 1, (11) becomes
θD(
1
θ
) = (θ − 1)D′(1
θ
) (19)
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Given the function D(x), the equilibrium pair (θˆ, θˆ∗) is found.
However, more realistic case is economically asymmetric nations having
different demands for each other’s currency. In this case, the equality (18) no
longer holds. So the nations will have different tariffs imposed on imported
commodities.
In [5], the following demand functions for symmetric nations were con-
sidered: D(x) = D∗( 1
x
) = (1 + x)−2. Since two nations are economically
symmetric, we have θˆ = θˆ∗, eˆ = 1. Use (19) to solve the equation for θ.
Given
D(x) = D∗(
1
x
) = (1 + x)−2
the derivative of the function is
D′(x) = − 2
(1 + x)3
putting it into (19) gives
θ
(1 + 1
θ
)2
= (θ − 1)(− 2
(1 + 1
θ
)3
)
solving for θ yields
−2θ
1 + θ
(θ − 1) = 1
θ =
1
3
= θ∗
The solution (eˆ, θˆ, θˆ∗) = (1, 1
3
, 1
3
) agrees with Schwartz’s results. So in
case of symmetric nations with the foreign currency demand functions given
by D(x) and D∗( 1
x
), we obtained the Nash equilibrium point at equal tariffs
to be imposed that maximize the gain for both nations from trade. However,
neither is able to tax the competitor by a greater amount than itself being
taxed by.
In addition, we consider two more examples.
Symmetric case.
Here we consider one more symmetric case. Suppose D(x) = D∗( 1
x
) = (1 −
αx)+, α < 1. Similarly applying (19) leads to the following solution. Given
D(x) = D∗(
1
x
) = (1− αx)+
8
the derivative is
D′(x) = −α
putting it in (19) gives
θ(1− α
θ
) = (θ − 1)(−α)
solving for θ
θ − α = α− αθ
θ =
2α
1 + α
= θ∗
So the Nash equilibrium point is (eˆ, θˆ, θˆ∗) = (1, 2α
1+α
, 2α
1+α
). Similarly,
given any value α < 1, which defines the shapes of the demand functions,
the equilibrium point will occur at the same tariffs for both nations.
Asymmetric case.
Now we generalize the problem to a more common asymmetric case.Suppose
D(x) = exp(−δx), D∗(x) = (αx exp(βx)) ∧ 1. Then solving (5) yields the
equilibrium exchange rate
e =
−θ ln(αθ∗)
θθ∗β + δ
The Nash equilibrium condition (12),(13) gives
θ =
δ(θ∗ − 1) ln(αθ∗)− δ
θ∗β
and (Appendix B)
βθ∗(θ∗ − 1) = (θ∗β − δ(θ∗ − 1) ln(αθ∗) + δ)(θ∗ − (θ∗ − 1) ln(αθ∗)).
Specifically, if α = 0.01, β = 2, δ = 2.5 the Nash equilibrium point is
(eˆ, θˆ, θˆ∗) = (0.81, 0.54, 0.73). The equilibrium exchange rate which is the
solution of (5) is illustrated in the following figure:
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Here the Nash equilibrium point is obtained for the case where D(x) 6=
D∗(1/x). Solution to the system of equations (10), (11) leads to a domestic
nation imposing greater tariff than the foreign nation. Initially, based only
on the shapes of the functions D(x) and D∗(x), it is impossible to identify
which nation is ”economically stronger” and therefore will have a greater
optimal tariff.
4 Conclusion
It can be concluded that the non-cooperative trade game results in a problem
of optimizing tariffs on imported commodities. Optimal tariffs to be imposed
are found at the Nash equilibrium point which are the solutions to the system
of equations (13),(14),(15). The shapes of demand functions determine the
economic power one nation has over another. However, from the demand
functions alone, it is impossible to predict which nation will have a greater
optimal tariff to be imposed. It is assumed that the distributions of commodi-
ties exchanged and the prices for those commodities are known. Examples
above are intended to illustrate the typical cases of economically symmetric
and asymmetric nations involved in non-cooperative bilateral trade game.
Obviously, in real world scenario, the demand functions are not predeter-
mined. They are derived from (1) and (2). Finally, as an important note, it
must be stressed that the vast improvement of the probabilistic model is that
it does not restrict itself within the assumption of static prices and demand
for commodities. Availability of imports and the tariffs affect the prices and
10
demand for commodities. As long as they are made to be random, the model
adequately responds to these changing conditions by considering different
prices and demands on commodities.
Appendix A
The following system of equations determine the tariffs each nation has
to set in order to obtain the maximum gains from trade
∂
∂θ
G(e, θ, θ∗) = Gθ(e, θ, θ∗) +Ge(e, θ, θ∗)eθ = 0, (20)
∂
∂θ
G∗(e, θ, θ∗) = G∗θ∗(e, θ, θ
∗) +G∗e(e, θ, θ
∗)eθ = 0, (21)
where the index denotes the partial derivative of a given function with respect
to a given variable.
If we define g(e, θ) = e
θ
and g(e, θ∗) = 1
θ∗e , the individual components of
(20) and (21) become
Gθ(e, θ, θ
∗) =
∂
∂g
[−
∫ ∞
g
yD′(y)dy]
∂g
∂θ
− ∂
∂θ
D∗(θ∗e) (22)
= gD′(g)g′(θ)
=
e
θ
D′(
e
θ
)(− e
θ2
) = −e
2
θ3
D′(
e
θ
),
Ge(e, θ, θ
∗) =
∂
∂g
[−
∫ ∞
g
yD′(y)dy]
∂g
∂e
− ∂
∂e
D∗(θ∗e) (23)
= gD′(g)g′(e)− θ∗D∗′(θ∗e) = e
θ2
D′(
e
θ
)− θ∗D∗′(θ∗e),
G∗θ∗(e, θ, θ
∗) =
∂
∂g
[
∫ ∞
g
1
y
D∗′
(
1
y
)
dy]
∂g
∂θ∗
− ∂
∂θ∗
D
(e
θ
)
(24)
= −θ∗eD∗′(θ∗e)(− 1
θ∗2e
) =
1
θ∗
D∗′(θ∗e),
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G∗e(e, θ, θ
∗) =
∂
∂g
[
∫ ∞
g
1
y
D∗′
(
1
y
)
dy]
∂g
∂e
− ∂
∂e
D
(e
θ
)
(25)
= −θ∗eD∗′(θ∗e)(− 1
θ∗e2
)− 1
θ
D′(
e
θ
) =
1
e
D∗′(θ∗e)− 1
θ
D′(
e
θ
)
eθ and eθ∗ can be found from (5) as follows. Let us define
F (e, θ, θ∗) = eD(
e
θ
)−D∗(θ∗e). (26)
Differentiating (26) with respect to θ and θ∗ separately and equating them
to zero yields the system of equations
Fθ(e, θ, θ
∗) + Fe(e, θ, θ∗)eθ = 0,
Fθ∗(e, θ, θ
∗) + Fe(e, θ, θ∗)e∗θ = 0,
from which solving for eθ and eθ∗ gives
eθ = −Fθ(e, θ, θ
∗)
Fe(e, θ, θ∗)
=
e2
θ2
D′( e
θ
)
D( e
θ
) + e
θ
D′( e
θ
)− θ∗D∗′(θ∗e) , (27)
eθ∗ = −Fθ∗(e, θ, θ
∗)
Fe(e, θ, θ∗)
=
eD∗′(θ∗e)
D( e
θ
) + e
θ
D′( e
θ
)− θ∗D∗′(θ∗e) (28)
Putting these solutions into the system of equations (20)(21) yields the fol-
lowing results. From (20) we have
∂
∂θ
G(e(θ, θ∗), θ, θ∗) (29)
= −e
2
θ3
D′(
e
θ
) + [
e
θ2
D′(
e
θ
)− θ∗D∗′(θ∗e)]
[
e2
θ2
D′( e
θ
)
D( e
θ
) + e
θ
D′( e
θ
)− θ∗D∗′(θ∗e)
]
=
e2
θ2
D′( e
θ
)
D( e
θ
) + e
θ
D′( e
θ
)− θ∗D∗′(θ∗e)
×
[
e
θ2
D′(
e
θ
)− θ∗D∗′(θ∗e)− 1
θ
[
D(
e
θ
) +
e
θ
D′(
e
θ
)− θ∗D∗′(θ∗e)
]]
=
eθ
θ2
[
eD′(
e
θ
)− θ2θ∗D∗′(θ∗e)− θD(e
θ
)− eD′(e
θ
) + θθ∗D∗′(θ∗e)
]
=
eθ
θ
[−D(e
θ
) + θ∗(1− θ)D∗′(θ∗e)] = 0
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and from (9) we have
∂
∂θ∗
G∗(e(θ, θ∗), θ, θ∗) (30)
=
1
θ∗
D∗′(θ∗e) + [
1
e
D∗′(θ∗e)− 1
θ
D′(
e
θ
)][
eD∗′(θ∗e)
D( e
θ
) + e
θ
D′( e
θ
)− θ∗D∗′(θ∗e) ]
=
eD∗′(θ∗e)
D( e
θ
) + e
θ
D′( e
θ
)− θ∗D∗′(θ∗e)
×
[
1
eθ∗
[D(
e
θ
) +
e
θ
D′(
e
θ
)− θ∗D∗′(θ∗e)] + [1
e
D∗′(θ∗e)− 1
θ
D′(
e
θ
)]
]
=
eθ∗
e
[
1
θ∗
D(
e
θ
) +
e
θ∗θ
D′(
e
θ
)−D∗′(θ∗e) +D∗′(θ∗e)− e
θ
D′(
e
θ
)
]
=
eθ∗
θ∗e
[D(
e
θ
)− e
θ
(θ∗ − 1)D′(e
θ
)] = 0
Hence
D(
e
θ
) = θ∗(1− θ)D∗′(θ∗e),
D(
e
θ
) =
e
θ
(θ∗ − 1)D′(e
θ
).
For the second derivatives we have
∂2
∂θ2
G(e(θ, θ∗), θ, θ∗)
=
θeθθ − eθ
θ2
[θ∗(1− θ)D∗′(θ∗e)−D(e
θ
)]
+
eθ
θ
[
θ∗2(1− θ)eθD∗′′(θ∗e)− θ∗D∗′(θ∗e)− eθθ − e
θ2
D′(
e
θ
)
]
, (31)
∂2
∂θ∗2
G∗(e(θ, θ∗), θ, θ∗)
=
eθ∗eθ∗θ∗ − θ∗e2θ∗ − eeθ∗
(eθ∗)2
[D(
e
θ
)− e
θ
(θ∗ − 1)D′(e
θ
)]
+
eθ∗
eθ∗
[
eθ∗
θ
D′(
e
θ
)− (1− θ
∗)eθ∗ − e
θ
D′(
e
θ
)− (1− θ
∗)eθ∗e
θ2
D′′(
e
θ
)
]
=
eθ∗eθ∗θ∗ − θ∗e2θ∗ − eeθ∗
(eθ∗)2
[D(
e
θ
)− e
θ
(θ∗ − 1)D′(e
θ
)]
+
eθ∗
eθ∗
[
θ∗eθ∗ + e
θ
D′(
e
θ
)− (1− θ
∗)eθ∗e
θ2
D′′(
e
θ
)
]
. (32)
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Assuming that the system (10), (11) has a unique solution and xD(x) →
0, as x→∞, we get
xD(
x
θ
)−D∗(θ∗x) > 0, if x < e,
xD(
x
θ
)−D∗(θ∗x) = 0, if x = e,
xD(
x
θ
)−D∗(θ∗x) < 0, if x > e.
Then
d
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=e
(xD(
x
θ
)−D∗(θ∗x)) = D(e
θ
) +
e
θ
D′(
e
θ
)− θ∗D∗′(θ∗e) < 0
and from (27),(28) follows that eθ > 0, eθ∗ < 0. Since first summands of
(31),(32) are zeros, the conditions ∂
2
∂θ2
G(e(θ, θ∗), θ, θ∗) < 0, ∂
2
∂θ∗2G
∗(e(θ, θ∗), θ, θ∗) <
0 provide (16),(17).
Appendix B
Differentiating the given demand functions
D(x) = exp(−δx), D∗(x) = αx exp(βx) (33)
gives
D′(x) = −δ exp(−δx), D∗′(x) = (αβx+ α) exp(βx), (34)
D′′(x) = δ2 exp(δx), D∗′′(x) = (αβ2x+ 2αβ) exp(βx) (35)
The equilibrium exchange rate is found from (5) as follows
e exp(−δ e
θ
) = αθ∗e exp(βθ∗e), (36)
−δ e
θ
= ln(αθ∗) + βθ∗e,
e(θθ∗β + δ) = −θ ln(αθ∗),
e =
−θ ln(αθ∗)
θθ∗β + δ
. (37)
From (11) we find θ
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exp(−δ e
θ
) =
e
θ
(θ∗ − 1)(−δ exp(−δ e
θ
)),
1 =
e
θ
(1− θ∗)δ,
1 =
(θ∗ − 1)δ ln(αθ∗)
θθ∗β + δ
,
θ =
(θ∗ − 1)δ ln(αθ∗)− δ
θ∗β
. (38)
Putting (37),(38) into (10) leads to the solution of θ∗. Specifically, redefining
(10) in terms of (33) gives
exp(−δ e
θ
) = θ∗(1− θ)α exp(βθ∗e)(βθ∗e+ 1),
putting (37) into this equation results in the following expression
exp(δ
ln(αθ∗)
θθ∗β + δ
) = θ∗(1− θ)α exp(βθ∗[−θ ln(αθ
∗)
θθ∗β + δ
])(βθ∗[
−θ ln(αθ∗)
θθ∗β + δ
] + 1),
replacing θ with its definition from (38)
exp(
δ ln(αθ∗)
(θ∗ − 1)δ ln(αθ∗)− δ + δ )
= θ∗
θ∗β − (θ∗ − 1)δ ln(αθ∗) + δ
θ∗β
α exp(
1− (θ∗ − 1) ln(αθ∗)
θ∗ − 1 )(
1− (θ∗ − 1) ln(αθ∗)
θ∗ − 1 ),
eliminating and rearranging some terms gives a simplified equation
exp(
1
θ∗ − 1)
=
θ∗β − (θ∗ − 1)δ ln(αθ∗) + δ
β
α exp(
1− (θ∗ − 1) ln(αθ∗)
θ∗ − 1 )
θ∗ − (θ∗ − 1) ln(αθ∗)
θ∗ − 1 ,
combining the exponents gives
exp(
1
θ∗ − 1 −
1− (θ∗ − 1) ln(αθ∗)
θ∗ − 1 )
=
θ∗β − (θ∗ − 1)δ ln(αθ∗) + δ
β
α
θ∗ − (θ∗ − 1) ln(αθ∗)
θ∗ − 1 ,
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simplifying the power of the exponent yields
αθ∗ =
θ∗β − (θ∗ − 1)δ ln(αθ∗) + δ
β
α
θ∗ − (θ∗ − 1) ln(αθ∗)
θ∗ − 1 ,
finally, we obtain the equation involving only θ∗ to solve for
βθ∗(θ∗ − 1) = (θ∗β − (θ∗ − 1)δ ln(αθ∗) + δ)(θ∗ − (θ∗ − 1) ln(αθ∗)). (39)
This equation cannot be explicitly solved for θ∗ but it can be computed
approximately. Putting α = 0.01, β = 2, δ = 2.5 into (39) gives θ∗ = 0.73,
putting this value into (38) gives θ = 0.54, and ultimately the equilibrium
exchange rate is obtained by putting these values in (37) which gives e = 0.81.
So the equilibrium tripe is (eˆ, θˆ, θˆ∗) = (0.81, 0.54, 0.73).
The derivatives of the exchange rate function with respect to θ∗ and θ are
eθ∗ =
βθ2θ∗ ln(αθ∗)− θ(θθ∗β + δ)
θ∗(θθ∗β + δ)2
= −0.49,
eθ =
−δ ln(αθ∗)
(θθ∗β + δ)2
= 1.13.
Using (34)-(36), inequalities (16),(17) take the form
θ∗(1− θ)eθ(θ∗eβ2 + 2β)− θ∗e− 1 + δ
θ2
(eθθ − e) < 0,
θ(θ∗eθ∗ + e) + δ(1− θ∗)eeθ∗ < 0.
For (eˆ, eˆθ, eˆθ∗ , θˆ, θˆ
∗) = (0.81, 1.13,−0.49, 0.54, 0.73), these inequalities can be
verified.
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